In the recently concluded ‘Summit of the Future’ organised by the United Nations, member countries adopted the ‘Global Digital Compact’ (GDC). This ambitious instrument is perhaps the first of its kind in the international arena focusing on the potential of digital technologies, with the specific intention to harness and regulate them for the common good.

What is the GDC?

The GDC is not a binding law but a diplomatic instrument with a set of shared goals for governments, institutions, firms, and other stakeholders to bear in mind. Once there is greater adherence, the terms of the compact may become soft laws in each country.

Earlier, the UN helped pilot and legitimise two other compacts: the ‘Global Compact’ (“a voluntary initiative based on CEO commitments to implement universal sustainability principles and to take steps to support UN goals”) and the ‘Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration’ (covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner).

The GDC rests on the idea that digital technologies are dramatically changing our world. While they offer potential benefits for societies and for our planet — by enabling Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) — they also pose serious challenges and concerns.

Realising the GDC

The GDC is a collaborative project with the objective of ensuring human oversight of technologies in ways that advance sustainable development. Building on the norms of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human rights, and the UN 2030 Agenda, among others, the GDC proposes global cooperation in the governance of data and digital technologies

To meet the Compact’s goals, UN member countries have committed to establish two panels — an ‘Independent International Scientific Panel on AI [Artificial Intelligence]’ and a panel for ‘Global Dialogue on AI Governance’.

These goals include closing the digital divide, including everyone in the digital economy, improving access to data, and advancing responsible and equable data governance. In the same vein, the Compact’s principles are based on inclusive participation, access to data and digital technologies, sustainability, and trustworthy technologies that function within a free and competitive market.

Digital goods and services

To address the digital divide, the GDC proposes “digital public goods” that will include open-source software, open data, and open AI models, plus adherence to privacy and best practices.

This is an acknowledgment of digital public goods’ ability to drive social change as elements of a “digital public infrastructure” that delivers services. Such infrastructure involves the development and use of shared digital systems according to specific priorities and needs of stakeholders. To this end, the GDC envisions partnerships, including with private entities.

What are the GDC’s lacunae?

First, the extensive European experience with public-private partnerships vis-à-vis digital projects suggests openness within such partnerships is restricted between ‘as open as is required’ and ‘as closed as is essential’. In other words, openness in the context of the digital public infrastructure may be limited by contractual requirements such as non-disclosure, confidentiality, and protection of intellectual property.

Second, the GDC adds little to existing frameworks of internet governance but importantly it calls for digital technology companies to self-regulate to keep their users safe and their users’ trust. This is not an optimum solution because self-regulation has already proved to be ineffective in practice.

Third, the GDC recognises interoperable data governance as essential to foster innovation and promote economic growth. But experts have noted that the increasing collection, sharing, and processing of data — particularly for AI — may amplify risks in the absence of effective personal data protection and privacy laws.

Fourth, the Compact stresses on achieving SDGs within a paradigm where governments and private entities track, collect, and analyse data to measure progress, while underscoring the importance of governing data in the public interest. For this the Compact proposes to give corporate entities more power in data and internet governance. However, it fails to emphasise the countervailing measures required to stave off monopolistic control.

The GDC and the UN

In many sections the GDC makes wishful statements that bypass the complexity of underlying issues, assuming the comity of nations will be enough to achieve its objectives. But this stance may also reflect the UN’s wish to remain a major player in governing technologies, including AI.

For example, in the 21st century data is oil: it is as valuable even as its use is embedded in extractive industries with polluting effects. Consider the ongoing explosive growth of generative AI models and the spheres, volumes, and varieties of data collected to train them. The GDC acknowledges issues in AI governance but has little to offer in terms of concrete solutions or even strategies.

Similarly, the GDC does bat for “data flow with trust” but many countries have refused to accept this idea because it goes against the spirit of digital sovereignty. Some even have specific laws that require data about their citizens to remain within their borders.

Finally, the GDC links various objectives and proposed actions with the relevant SDGs. This is a welcome move because it reflects the view that digitisation should play a prominent role in realising the SDGs. At the same time, when the SDGs were adopted in 2015, the current AI revolution hadn’t started. Given the unimpressive record of nations in realising the SDGs, it is doubtful whether an add-on Compact like the GDC could make a difference.

The UN’s member states are striving to find ways to work with and regulate Big Tech while also asserting their digital sovereignty. The global governance of digital technologies thus is too complex to be captured or ‘fixed’ by a singular entity like the GDC. We need multilateral as well as regional negotiations to go with it to address jurisdictional, regional, and/or local needs. By appealing to existing modes of digital governance as well as by combining SDGs with digitalisation, the GDC is positioning itself as an instrument of brainstorming rather than as a provider of roadmaps. Still, the GDC can help with capacity building and with South-South and North-South collaborations in the development of digital public goods.

In sum, the GDC may not result in a paradigm shift in the world’s governance of digital technologies but it can facilitate significant and tangible outcomes if member states take it seriously.

Neethu Rajam is Associate professor of intellectual property and technology law, National Law University Delhi. Krishna Ravi Srinivas is Adjunct professor of law, NALSAR University of Law Hyderabad.